WWII Discussion

[newguy31]

I know you did Cam. I just wanted to point out that the Russians did fight the japanese in ww2. Thats all I am saying.How little do we know right? I just found that out today as well. Not only am I not doing what you say I am doing, I am researching. Without researching articles, newspaper clippings, other historian takes on events how would a debate continue without bringing new evidence to light? Particulary the Russians fighting the Japanese in WW2? So you say I am reposting random posts but I say I am researching various think groups and even have peacefully succumbed in saying America did play a part in helping Russia to victory, although the case can historically and methodically be debated on how much and to what extent it did help the Russians in their victory. I'm learning new things right now and looking them up and then stemming outward from there. I hope we all are

Yes I know that the winter played a huge part in the Germans being defeated but noone ever states the shape of the Russian army was in when this occured. They were beaten up badly too and their morale was low due to the conditions of not only the war that was taking place by the "sucker punch", but also by Stalins purging of the ranks leaving unqualified officers, well conversed in politics though, in the field to replace those that were supposedly enemies of the regime at the time. Civilians had a rough time as well with the their living conditions, arrangments, food etc etc. Russia instituted a training program for these new officers but by the time the Germans attacked in 1941, they were still not ready in their command structure. Even though Germany was steadily marching towards Moscow, news of how they treated civilians and soldiers of conquered cities eventually made its way through the grapevines, and where the nazis may have made alliances and friends, this further brought about the fighting resistance in the Red Army and nation as a whole. Instead of fearing what Stalin might do to them if they did not fight, they started to fear more of what the Germans would do if they were captured. Russia's agriculture at the time of 1939 was the same as it was in 1928 with a 40 million increase in population. That tells me that chances are there might have been some people hungry and starving even before lend lease was initiated/implemented. So according to this, the Germans could have won if they played it smarter, sure, but to say that the Russians were in better shape, physically and mentally, and not affected by the winter is coercively wrong. True Hitler made mistakes but I believe it was the fighting spirit of the Russian Army and their people that had the greatest effect. Fear is a powerful motivator!

You said it yourself Cam, It is "likely", probable, that might have happened. As much as it is plausible that the Russians would have conquered it by themselves without any help. After all, they did get the fins to give up some land!
Hey 15ICAM, can you post your paper in a word doc so we can read it please? I am interested in reading it as I am sure others here are.

What sources do you get your information from? My debate teacher told me if you find 20 different sources that say the same thing chances are it is correct. Also you do not need to tell me what your learning or what you have done with your education as this gives a halo effect on your position. I am sure you have more friends than I on here who know you well and agree with you, instead, you can just give me your facts and I can rebute them or agree with them and continue the conversation. Not being hostile, if I was please show me an instance of when.

[mrcharlie]

Cool deal cam, I would like to read your paper as well. I am a long time WW2 history buff and I find this discussion fascinating.

[15ICAM]

Hey guys I have no idea how to link a word document to this forum so I copied it. Below is my essay on the background of Japanese Naval Theory in the interwar period specifically on how it relates to the development of aircraft carriers. I apologize for the formatting as copy/paste messed it all up. While there was a great deal more information I wished to include, the submission requirements were to keep the essay at 1000 words or less

The interwar period between WWI and WWII was a time that set the stage for one of the most prolific contests between world powers the world has ever seen. The actions of the militaries and governments during this time changed the face of battle that would set the tone of warfare for years to come. The technological advances that occurred gave a whole new aspect of war in terms of mobility and firepower. In the prelude to war, there was a great disparity in the level of innovation that occurred among the soon to be adversaries. Although there are many factors that are involved in military innovation, there are few that form a common thread among those who achieved the greatest level of success.[1] A military organization that is capable of successful innovation is one that has a specificity of purpose and an effective military culture, as illustrated by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in its development of aircraft carriers.
The first indicator of a military that exhibits successful innovation is one that has a specific problem they must address. In the case of military innovation, a specific military problem is one where the answer to the problem results in a marked advantage towards achieving national goals.[2] In the case of the IJN, the development of the aircraft carrier as a mobile and lethal striking force was a logical response to the problems of projecting power across the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, the need for a decisive engagement to avoid a prolonged war, and the restrictions placed upon them by the Washington Naval Treaty.[3] The first aspect of the Japanese defining their specific problem of power projection comes from the development of the Imperial National Defense Policy sanctioned in 1907. One of the basic principles of this policy was to establish the United States as the adversary towards which the Imperial Navy would build it strategic vision.[4] This principle was based off Alfred T Mahan’s principle of preparing for the most formidable danger.[5] While the fleet viewed the traditional surface engagement as the primary way of this power projection, they realized that air superiority would be a critical requirement to success.[6] Given the vast distances involved in fighting a naval battle in the Pacific, land base aircraft would not be able to participate so the determination was made that carrier based aviation would be a crucial element to the IJN success.[7] The second aspect of the Japanese problem of waging war against the United States was one that required a swift decisive encounter early in the war to dissuade the United States from further conflict and prevent the full mobilization of American industry with which Japan could not compete.[8] The resulting strategy developed into a plan of capturing the Philippines which would draw the US Fleet into action. The Japanese planned to attrite the US fleet as they crossed the Pacific via submarine and carrier based air power so that by the time the decisive fleet on fleet action occurred, Japan would enjoy a numerical advantage.[9] The third major component of the Japanese problem was the restrictions placed upon the IJN by the Washington Naval treaty which limited the number of capital ships Japan could posses. The Japanese viewed the restriction put upon them as a result of the treaty as a serious detriment for them to be able to counter the U.S. Navy. [10] The treaty however allowed the conversion of almost finished capital ships into large fleet carriers. The carriers Kaga and the Akagi were the result of this conversion which allowed the Japanese to experiment and learn the advantages of large fast carriers.[11] The benefits of the large carriers learned during this experimentation became immediately clear to the IJN, and was instrumental to the development of the future designs of fleet carriers that Japan would enter WWII with. [12]
The second indication of a military that is capable of innovation is one that posses an effective military culture. A military culture that is considered successful in innovation is one that uses the power of intellect, tradition, and a professional objective view to ready their forces for combat against a perceived threat.[13] As stated above, the IJN was able to make an honest assessment of its potential adversary in the Pacific and understood particularly well the numerical disadvantage forced upon them by the Washington Naval treaty. This open analysis of the problem led the IJN to emphasize new technology in warship, aircraft, and weapon design and tactics that could offset their inferior position.[14] In the mid 1920s during drastic cuts in the naval budget, the IJN seemed to be headed in a direction that would stall innovation. Unhappy with the perceived humiliation of the Japanese created by the Washington Naval Treaty, Admiral Kato Kanji and the Imperial naval general staff were able to gain power in the IJN and set the military and political agenda to allow for naval re-armament through a continuing path of innovation.[15] This change of power shifted the perspective of the IJN from one of avoiding war with the U.S. to one that deemed war an inevitable proposition. This new focus on impending conflict led the IJN to conduct intensive exercises in the late 1920’s designed to evaluate the effectiveness of their surface fleet both in tactics and ship design.[16] These exercises formed the base of knowledge and technology in the IJN that would lead to their tactical success in the initial naval engagements of WWII.[17] The effect of the influence of the IJN general staff and their clearly defined analysis of the U.S. as a threat and their own capabilities facilitated the procurement of the necessary resources to expand the procurement of aircraft carriers and naval aviation through the late 1930’s.[18]
The IJN demonstrated successful innovation in its development of aircraft carriers through its ability to successfully specifying its problem and having an effective military culture. Through a careful and objective analysis of the military problem and a leadership culture that was determined to achieve victory, the IJN was successful at naval innovation in the inert war period. The result of this successful innovation was a modern and capable fleet that enjoyed tremendous tactical success at the beginning of WWII. The IJN’s innovation is relevant to the modern military officer because it demonstrates the importance of clearly defining a military problem with-in a framework of a culture that can use that information to drive change and progress.

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[1] Murray, Williamson and Allan R Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 310

[2] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 310

[3] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 310

[4] Asada, Sadao “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars: The Revolt against the Washington Treaty, The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927” Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. H200:Military Innovation in Peace and War Syllabus and Book of Readings. Ft Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2011, 105

[5] Asada “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars: The Revolt against the Washington Treaty, The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927, 106

[6] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 204

[7] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 204

[8] Asada, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars: The Revolt against the Washington Treaty, The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927,107

[9] Asada “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars: The Revolt against the Washington Treaty, The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927, 112

[10] Kuehn, John T “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany.” Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. H200:Military Innovation in Peace and War Syllabus and Book of Readings. Ft Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2011, 96

[11] Kuehn, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany.” ,96

[12] Kuehn, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany.”, 96

[13] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,313

[14] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 204

[15] Kuehn, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany”, 95

[16] Kuehn, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany.” ,97

[17] Kuehn, “Carrier Airpower Between the Wars, Perspectives from Great Britian, Japan, and Germany.”, 97

[18] Murray, Millet, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. , 204

[TOU]

Well done Cam, thank you for posting this.

[SONYtec]

Always good to learn something.

[newguy31]

very good written paper cam! glad to read it. If you have more laying around you should post them as well!